III-3 Śrī Bhāshya | Rāmānuja | 35-36

The last clause means--on account of their results not being of an infinite nature.

--Here terminates the Adhikaraṇa of 'option.'

A doubt arises whether meditations such as the one enjoined in the text, 'Let him meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgītha,' which are connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice such as the Udgītha, contribute towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and hence must be performed at the sacrifice as part of it; or whether they, like the godohana vessel, benefit the agent apart from the sacrifice, and therefore may be undertaken according to desire.--But has it not been already decided under III, 3, 42 that those meditations are generally beneficial to man, and not therefore restricted to the sacrifices?--True; it is just for the purpose of further confirming that conclusion that objections are now raised against it on the ground of some inferential marks (linga) and reasoning. For there it was maintained on the strength of the text 'therefore he does both' that those meditations have results independent of the sacrifice. But there are several reasons favouring the view that those meditations must be connected with the sacrifices as subordinate members, just as the Udgītha and the rest to which the meditations refer. Their case is by no means analogous to that of the godohana vessel, for, while in the case of the latter, the text expressly declares the existence of a special result, 'For him who is desirous of cattle he is to bring water in a godohana,' the texts enjoining those meditations do not state special results for them. For clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udgītha' intimate only that the Udgītha is connected with the meditation; while their connexion with certain results is known from other clauses, such as 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that is more vigorous' (according to which the result of such meditations is only to strengthen the result of the sacrifices). And when a meditation of this kind has, on the ground of its connexion with the Udgītha or the like--which themselves are invariably connected with sacrifices-- been cognised to form an element of a sacrifice, some other passage which may declare a fruit for that meditation can only be taken as an arthavāda; just as the passage which declares that he whose sacrificial ladle is made of parna wood does not hear an evil sound. In the same way, therefore, as the Udgītha and so on, which are the bases of those meditations, are to be employed only as constituent parts of the sacrifices, so the meditations also connected with those constituent parts are themselves to be employed as constituent parts of the sacrifices only.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by the fact of injunction, i.e. thereby that clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udgītha' enjoin the meditation as standing to the Udgītha in the relation of a subordinate member. Injunctions of this kind differ from injunctions such as 'he is to bring water in the godohana vessel for him who desires cattle'; for the latter state a special qualification on the part of him who performs the action, while the former do not, and hence cannot claim independence.

The text 'from the seat of the Hotri he sets right the wrong Udgītha' shows that the meditation is necessarily required for the purpose of correcting whatever mistake may be made in the Udgītha. This also proves that the meditation is an integral part of the sacrificial performance.

The text 'By means of that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds. With Om the Adhvaryu gives orders, with Om the Hotri recites, with Om the Udgātri sings,' which declares the praṇava--which is a 'quality' of the meditation, in so far as it is its basis--to be common to the three Vedas, further shows that the meditation has to be employed in connexion with the sacrifice. For the meditation is connected with the Udgītha, and the Udgītha is an integral part of all sacrificial performances whatever. Of the primā facie view thus far set forth the next Sūtra disposes.

It is not true that the meditations on the Udgītha and the rest are bound to the sacrifices in the same way as the Udgītha, and so on, themselves are; for Scripture does not declare that they go together with, i.e. are subordinate constituents of the Udgītha, and so on. The clause 'Let him meditate on the Udgītha' does not indeed itself state another qualification on the part of the agent (i.e. does not state that the agent in entering on the meditation is prompted by a motive other than the one prompting the sacrifice); but the subsequent clause, ' whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that becomes more vigorous,' intimates that knowledge is the means to render the sacrificial work more efficacious, and from this it follows that the meditation is enjoined as a means towards effecting a result other than the result of the sacrifice. And hence the meditation cannot be viewed as a subordinate member of the Udgītha, which itself is a subordinate member of the sacrifice. It rather has the Udgītha for its basis only. He only indeed who is qualified for the sacrifice is qualified for the meditation, since the latter aims at greater efficaciousness of the sacrifice; but this does not imply that the meditation necessarily goes with the sacrifice. By the greater vigour of the sacrifice is meant its non-obstruction by some other sacrificial work of greater strength, its producing its effect without any delay.--The case of a statement such as 'he whose ladle is of parna wood hears no evil sound' is different. There the text does not declare that the quality of consisting of parna wood is the direct means of bringing about the result of no evil sound being heard; hence there is no valid reason why that quality should not be subordinate to the ladle, which itself is subordinate to the sacrifice; and as it is not legitimate to assume for the mere subordinate constituents of a sacrifice special fruits (other than the general fruit of the sacrifice), the declaration as to no evil sound being heard is to be viewed as a mere arthavāda (i.e. a mere additional statement meant further to glorify the result of the sacrifice--of which the ladle made of parna wood is a subordinate instrument).

A scriptural text, moreover, shows that the meditation is necessary for, and restricted to, the sacrificial performance. For the text 'A Brahman priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the officiating priests'--which declares that all priests are saved through the knowledge of the Brahman-- has sense only on the understanding that that knowledge is not restricted to the Udgātri, and so on (i.e. not to those priests who are engaged in carrying out the details of the sacrifices which are the 'bases' of the meditations).--The conclusion, therefore, is that those meditations are not restricted to the sacrifices, subordinate members of which serve as their 'bases.'

--This terminates the Adhikaraṇa of 'like the bases.'